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The “violence” of the canon: revisiting contemporary notions of the canonical 
 
Abstract 
 
The historical conditions surrounding the processes of forming a canon are rarely 
examined directly, yet it is these processes which govern over the realm of religious 
representations and identity constructions.  In light of recent critical scholarship, it is 
imperative to address theologically the role that the canon plays within a religious 
tradition.  This essay demonstrates the cultural necessity of canonical forms despite their 
“monotheistic tendency” to subdivide the world into binary oppositions.  By utilizing a 
scale of violence to determine the impact of the canonical form upon culture this essay 
offers an account of canons and their role in forming religious identities over and beyond 
the violence they are said to provoke.  Through this clarification, an alternative 
perspective of canons can emerge that reveals the violence at the core of cultural-
canonical norms, thus providing a valuable distinction between differing (violence-
concealing or violence-revealing) canonical forms. 
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The “Violence” of the Canon: Revisiting Contemporary Notions of Canonical Forms 
 
I. Introduction 
There is often a lurking suspicion in the popular imagination that the Catholic 
Church holds a vast repository of ancient documents that threaten to destroy the Church’s 
authority if they ever reached the light of day.  These non-canonical documents, as the 
stories generally go, were deemed heretical at some point in time and nearly destroyed, 
and are now allegedly stored deep within the secret vaults of the Vatican’s archives, so 
that their testimony—their contradictory witness to the normative historical record—
could be confidently suppressed and the Church could go about dominating history as it 
deems fit.1  The truth, of course, is that the Catholic Church has at times engaged in 
tactics such as these, though such acts of erasure and censure, one hopes, are nearing their 
end.  The tantalizing power of these “repressed” narratives eventually coming to light, 
however, is often enough to provoke the desires of those who feel their stories too are 
marginalized and in need of mainstream representation within the given media of their 
community.  Such desires, for example, have been behind those calls to admit the Bible’s 
hegemonic status among other texts and likewise to open the canon of scripture to other 
“non-canonical” works.2 
What this all-too-contemporary tale does not take into account, however, are the 
dynamics which govern the nature of canonical (and hence scriptural) representations 
themselves, the historical evolutions that mark scripture’s core coming-to-be—those 
processes termed canonicity.3  It is these processes themselves that offer us an insight 
into how any such “repressed narrative” might be capable of finding its own story 
reflected, not only in the ever-changing (more or less) open literary canons of the world, 
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but in the sacred, closed form of the canonical as well—a text that, by definition, is 
certainly capable of containing the opposed tensions of a desire for law and a call for 
justice simultaneously within its own pages.  This is not to suggest, however, that every 
closed or sacred canon performs such an act; indeed, this study intends to produce a 
series of criteria centered on the principle of violence—as developed through the works 
of Jan Assmann and René Girard—by which various sacred canons might be evaluated 
and therefore in some sense rendered distinguishable from one another.   
Canons, in their earliest forms, were a refinement of cultural and religious 
archives, a solid body of normative “texts” transmitted from one generation to another in 
order to identify and shape a given community.  Such canons were either orally 
transmitted or written, and could be used for either cultural or religious purposes (or both 
at the same time, as was often the case in the ancient world).  However, it was only the 
latter purposes (and even then generally in written form only) that led to the formation of 
a sacred scripture as we know it today in its western monotheistic forms.   
The question that the creation of such normative structures raises, however, is 
this: what are we to make of the place of such selected texts within a particular culture 
given that other texts, indeed other archives, were not chosen to identify the community?  
Are such texts (like the early Gnostic writings, for example) simply to be burned or 
buried in the sands of history?  Should (or even could) they be placed alongside the more 
normative canonical texts?  In other words, the basic question is whether or not selected 
canonical texts are capable of being distinguished from one another with regard to their 
relationship to non-canonical, archival, and “excessive” texts.  That is, do some canons 
welcome their non-canonical counterparts within the same archive (or particular 
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tradition) while others support an institution that would suppress, distort or discard them?  
What violences are canonical texts able to enclose within themselves in order to achieve 
canonical status?  Or can such a normative status be achieved otherwise than by violent 
means?  And what would such a canonical form look like? 
In essence, I argue in this essay that the canonical form can be seen to fluctuate 
along a sliding scale of normative texts which serve to either (1) deal with their non-
canonical counterparts and hence acknowledge their omission as necessary to the 
formation of normative texts (the definition of the “violence” which a canon could be 
said to perform), or (2) conceal or repress those very same violent acts.  It is with the 
former, however, that a new avenue for understanding the canonical (and hence 
scriptural) form is opened up.  Such an understanding in fact could be considered as 
“non-violent” (or perhaps simply “less” violent) insofar as it is able to provide narration 
for those persons whose stories are repressed in their particular socio-cultural contexts.  
Such canonical texts could possibly also lead to further contestations against the violence 
of unnecessary repressions or exclusions.  This form of a canon, if openly demonstrated, 
can provide a way for socially marginalized figures to re-write their own personal or 
communal narratives within the stories of that particular (often sacred) canon and thereby 
find avenues for the representation of their socially-constituted identities.  This is so 
because their stories of marginalization and repression will have already been present in 
the canonical text as stories which themselves reveal the violences of repression.  In this 
fashion, revelation becomes structurally bound to the canonical form itself and as such 
truly becomes an ongoing well-spring of justice found in canonical scriptural forms, as I 
hope to make clear in what follows.  This characteristic could moreover be said to be 
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guaranteed by the processes of canonicity themselves which continue long past the 
formation of an actual canon.   
This distinction between canonical forms becomes even more important to make 
when one stops to consider recent sustained criticisms levied against the monotheistic 
worldview brought about by the Judeo-Christian canon.4  Such critiques are often 
directed toward religious scriptures, though, as we will soon see, these critical voices also 
indicate that a general call toward opening the canonical form is not isolated to the recent 
past or a contemporary popularized cultural imagination.  They demonstrate how the 
issue with canons is one that extends beyond religious scripture and toward a perspective 
on canonical texts on the whole.  Accordingly, there needs to be an engagement with 
these dynamics from within a more contemporary theological framework if the canonical 
form is to be shown to be necessary for religious-cultural signification and the basis of 
religious identity formation in general, and not simply as a source of an unnecessary and 
detestable violence.   
In what follows, I hope to show how it is no coincidence that many scholars 
locate the site of a particular (monotheistic) violence within the nature of canons 
themselves.5  This is so because the establishment of the canon actually does function as 
a fundamental act of violence insofar as its construction and representation of the “other” 
is thoroughly invested in the processes of marking boundaries—of separating oneself 
from others (traditionally those subject to another canonical culture).  This feature is 
considered in fact to be a mark of a canon’s “non-translatability”, as we will see, a trait 
that renders the canon less fluid in cultural terms and causes canons to be firmly rooted in 
a particular religious or national context.6  I will show, moreover, that this is a necessity 
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for identity formation and representation in general, something which is inherently 
connected to the establishment and prominence of cultural canonical forms.  It would 
seem, then that there are only those canons that conceal the violence they perform—and 
thus multiply its effects and aftereffects—or those that disclose their proximity to 
violence and thereby offer an ever-increasing sense of justice a chance to flourish 
instead.7  And it is precisely by allowing these general characteristics of canons to unfold 
before us that we will begin to see just how relevant the specifically Judeo-Christian 
scriptures can be amidst so many competing canons today. 
 
II. On monotheism and violence 
 
It has long been recognized within scholarship on the canonical form that the 
canon itself  has what James Sanders refers to as a “monotheizing tendency”—a habit of 
dividing existent reality into binary forms.  This is a fact often responsible for the clichéd 
stereotyping of the “us-versus-them” mentality, though such a characterization does bear 
a certain political truth.8  From this perspective, it should come as no surprise that 
reactions to the biblical canon’s partitioning of reality into such demarcated spaces have 
been frequent and often harsh.9  One of the more recently influential and thus exemplary 
studies to put forward a general condemnation of the canonical form is Regina 
Schwartz’s The Curse of Cain, a polemically-structured critique of the monotheistic 
(biblical) canon.  For Schwartz, the biblical narrative became in fact the foundation for 
“Western culture’s central myth of collective identity.”  Utilizing the linked concepts of 
“scarcity” and “oneness” (associated with the exclusivity of a monotheistic worldview), 
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throughout her analysis she opposes them to the preferred notions of “generosity”, 
“plentitude” and “multiplicity” (with their polytheistic undertones).  By providing this 
contrast, she embarks upon a quest to eradicate the seeds of what she sees as collective 
violence embodied in the deity who would promote a relative frenzy of ownership for 
scarce resources (e.g. land, food, spouses, etc) in favor of one who would ensure peace 
through an offer of generosity and an embracing of differences which resist becoming 
permanent and remain nomadic.  In this scenario, the former is found in the god of 
monotheism; the latter, in the polytheistic impulses of the Near East that were quickly 
overshadowed by their powerful opponents. 
Accordingly, she posits that whereas scarcity provokes a response focused upon 
establishing greater definition in terms of political and sexual identity (thus giving shape 
to subsequent notions of what is to be considered as “familial” or “natural”), plentitude 
resists such limited characterizations, eschewing the “preoccupations” of a narrative that 
sets people at odds with one another.10  Like those critics of the canonical form who 
would argue for a return to a more egalitarian polytheistic worldview (as idealistic as it 
might appear at times), Schwartz contemplates a similar gesture in her condemnation of 
this monotheistic ideological identification.  In the end, she reasons, scarcity thinking 
would seem to impose a need for transcendence that ultimately ends up creating a distant 
and inaccessible deity.11  Latent in this critique is a profound call to a sort of immanent, 
polytheistic worldview, one that opposes the politically powerful transcendence of a 
monotheistic outlook on the world. 
What remains central to Schwartz’s critique of monotheism and is of heightened 
interest to this study is the illustrative position of the canonical form.  Her depiction of 
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the Hebrew canon’s formation as a response to the impending crisis of a loss of national 
identity prioritizes the fixation of communal boundaries and the rigidity of a Jewish 
identity constructed upon the seminal event of Exile.12  It was at this precise moment, in 
her view, that the fluid and evolving memories of the Jewish people were unjustly 
subjected to a process of canonization that effectively closed what should have otherwise 
remained open to the multiple views more prominently circulating within ancient Israel.  
For Schwartz, normative religious structures were much looser at this time in history, and 
the creation of a canonical scripture and tradition actually undermined the polyvalent 
Judaisms present at the time.  The Hebrew canon thus served in a very literal sense as an 
ideological constraint imposed upon otherwise often widely divergent narratives.  In turn, 
this creation of a canon subsequently gave rise to the canonical form’s resistance to 
“translatability”, perhaps the defining feature of its “monotheizing tendencies.”13  Instead 
of many voices crossing many boundaries, people within such a canonical community 
were forced to remain within a shell that could be seen as either protective or isolating.   
Employing the twin witnesses of the ancient prophet Jeremiah, with his insistence 
upon “rewriting scripture”, and contemporary psychological insights concerning an 
individual’s inability to ever fully provide closure to their own personal narrative, 
Schwartz concludes her critique with a call to open the biblical canon to new stories 
beyond the canonical boundary, and thereby also to the truth which enriches and 
proliferates within the multiplicity of narratives possible.14  Such is the only just way 
forward, she contends, and her conclusions have the potential to strike a deep chord with 
contemporary western culture. 
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Despite the obvious popular appeal which Schwartz’s claims hold, her account of 
the western monotheistic canonical form is not without its counter-claims—or at least 
subtle nuances that push us in other directions of thought.  Another somewhat similar 
voice can be found in the work of Mark S. Smith, who offers a critique that runs parallel 
to most of Schwartz’s and yet starkly registers the opposite conclusion.  Smith, in fact, 
provides a richer look into monotheism’s encapsulation of earlier polytheistic beliefs.  He 
diverges from Schwartz in his conclusions concerning the overall status and role of the 
canonical form within a given religious context.15   
Smith locates the three primary trends of monotheism’s incorporation of 
polytheism as (1) a convergence, or the assimilation of all the other deities into one, (2) a 
differentiation, or denying the other gods an existence and (3) a reinterpretation of the 
older polytheistic stories into monotheistic ones.16  Each of these maneuvers could be 
classified as a tactic of re-writing previously existent canonical traditions in a bid to 
create a more stabilized identity under the threat of an immanent historical crises, much 
as Schwartz had argued.  Indeed, for the most part, Smith’s critique parallels that of 
Schwartz, even going so far as to offer monotheism as an interpretive lens of reality that 
shaped Israel’s worldview in a particular nationalistic (ideological) manner.17   
Smith departs from this general critique, however, through his deepening of the 
notion of a collective memory within the text.  It is this feature, in his view, that serves to 
reflect God’s revelation, “what God selected to be remembered and forgotten of God’s 
relationship to Israel and the world,” thus turning any perceived ideological script into a 
divine directive.18  This, it should be carefully noted, is at once an effort to acknowledge 
a canon’s selective reading of history and yet also a way to illustrate how the processes 
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of canonicity cannot be so quickly dismissed as an inherently reactionary form of 
violence.  Such a reading of the canonical form might be seen as a critique of those who 
would jettison the significance attached to any subsequent historical development of 
particular faith traditions and their relation to the canonical form.  Smith’s decisive 
rendering of the biblical canonical narrative as a divine choice likewise places him 
among those who would see the integrity of the canon maintained, though the way we 
think about it is altered.19  In other words, in Smith’s estimation there is indeed a violence 
performed by the canonical form (or, one might say, by God) if a canon is to be perceived 
as sacred revelation at all.  It is a necessary violence that grants religious identity, akin to 
the marks of circumcision or tattooing made upon the body.  This is the price of religious 
and cultural signification—a reality that the canonical form directly signifies. 
The sustained capacity for religious and cultural signification found in a canon 
forms the basis for what Smith, in another context, calls the “non-translatable core” of the 
biblical canon, or that which allowed the early Hebrew people to resist the colonial 
powers of empire.20  By offering this reading and thereby furthering our understanding of 
how and why a canon might actually be utilized, Smith is able to illustrate a direct line of 
continuity between the biblical critique of empire and contemporary post-colonial 
critiques, at least insofar as both clearly draw from and yet resist the dominant cultural 
forms of a colonial power.21  The opening of this argument toward the political 
implications of canonical forms, especially with regard to the violence said to proceed 
from them, is crucial to expressing Smith’s overall concern toward those who would like 
to free the canon from its “non-translatable core”, something which Smith goes to great 
lengths to stress cannot be done without rendering the biblical canon bereft of its 
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identifying (signifying) power.  Canons, by this count, are not just about narrowing the 
multiplicity of narratives available within a given community; they are also about 
protecting a community’s identity when faced with external threats concerning its 
dissolution. 
What becomes uniquely discernable in Smith’s account is the fundamentally 
intertwined nature of both cultural and religious canons with the political and historical 
contexts in which they are born.  As I will contend, cultural and religious canons exert a 
social power aligned with a conception of politics as being essentially a polarized 
division: us versus them.  As such, canons tend to reflect the core identifying features of a 
given political landscape.  To transcend canonical, normative divisions would effectively 
be a claim to transcend politics as we know it.  Such a configuration of the political and 
the canonical can also help explain why there is an often insurmountable difficulty 
encountered when trying to transcend the particularities of a given political paradigm (its 
“non-translatability” so to speak). 
In Smith’s view and in other accounts that I will mention, the biblical canon 
utilizes its essential trait of non-translatability precisely as a powerful and necessary 
source of cultural signification so that communal identifications might develop as a form 
of “counter-resistance” to the types of violence imposed upon a particular canonical 
community.  Canonicity is therefore a move to posit “non-translatability” as being 
(though at times obscurely) the cornerstone of a (pre)formed cultural-canonical identity, 
something that can never really be suspended between two different canons and that can 
only be altered through a “conversion” from one cultural-canonical signifier to another.   
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To summarize the point, I would suggest that the validity of these varied 
contentions on either side of the debate, despite their differences, rests upon the reality of 
whether or not they correspond to a fuller understanding of the dimensions and 
consequences of the canonical form as a whole.  That is, we must ask ourselves whether 
certain canons promote violence while others seek to lessen its effects.  One might further 
inquire whether all canonical forms could be said to perform an act of violence which 
could otherwise have been avoided and replaced by a more diffuse, seemingly primordial 
(though perhaps vaguely stated) multiplicity devoid of any canonical form or (here 
following Smith) whether this violence of the canonical form simply alters our perception 
of the text itself, creating the blatant, though perhaps necessary, entrance of an often 
terrifying God.   
Resolving this impasse is not easy to do.  As I will argue, both sides in some 
sense also fail to account for the desires of canonicity which exist over and beyond any 
particular manifestation of the canonical form (especially in a religious sense).  The fact 
that these critical appraisals of Judaism’s monotheistic origins share so much in common 
in their overall analysis, diverting only in the manner through which they draw their 
conclusions from the material given, is partial evidence that there is no single answer to 
the problem of imposing canonical norms when one assesses the situation of the 
canonical form historically.   
In order to provide a constructive account of canons, what is necessary is a more 
proper distinction of the tensions that arise within canons themselves, such as what I will 
examine later in this essay.  In this way, these particular tensions might begin to reveal 
how the presumption of regarding a canonical “monotheizing” text as an inherently 
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violent text worth disregarding lacks a more rigorous account of the multiple forms of 
violence culturally present to us today also in canonical form and already indebted to the 
various and competing canons present within any given society.  This repositioning of the 
argument might therefore provide an account of canons which could actually serve to 
justify the cultural position of canons in the first place.  At the same time, it might also 
serve to demonstrate the need to distinguish between different canons, that is, to clarify 
the relationships already existent between differing canonical forms.   
Rather than perceive this logic as a justification for colonialist domination or for 
one canon’s reign over another, the imposition of a particular canon upon other canons 
and canonically-formed cultures could actually present an interesting though complex 
vantage point from which to revision the problem of the canonical form and its relation to 
violence.  For example, we might begin by looking into the myriad forms of resistance to 
particular canonical cultures that arise from within any given society, and indeed from 
within the same canonical form (e.g., with typical “heretical” movements).  As Smith has 
already indicated, postcolonial theory, as only one example of this type of resistance, 
becomes a genuinely visible vantage point from within a canonical-culture—an 
embedded position from which to critique the canonical form.   
It is no surprise moreover that postcolonial theory in particular has often allied 
itself with a deconstructionist philosophical framework in an attempt to dismantle the 
canonical forms of power that have exerted control over their cultures.  Such theories 
inquire whether there is a dynamic at work in the desire for canonicity which functions as 
an “imperialist assimilation of the Other” for which we must now give an account.22  To 
invoke a postcolonialist critique in such a fashion is not a rhetorical or co-incidental 
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strategy, as Smith has already demonstrated.  Rather, it is one that highlights “marginal” 
knowledges that appear to be “non-canonical” and that are other than the ethnocentrism 
of any given canon (akin to the production of “western knowledge”) because they 
interpret already-existing canons differently, with an ear to the violences with which they 
are either complicit or opposed.23 
Hence, following Smith’s appropriation of postcolonial theory, we could state that 
the canonical form in effect does promote a certain violence of introducing a fundamental 
division enacted by a monotheistic worldview, though not one that can simply be 
replaced or discarded.  To see the validity of the canonical form in this way, we must first 
explore a fuller exposition of the “violence” introduced through canons, which in many 
ways has only served to arouse suspicion regarding the overt imposition of particular 
canons upon others.24  As canons are a necessary part of all cultures, however, they are 
not so easily either dismissed or deconstructed.   
As will become clear in the analysis of the work of both Jan Assmann and René 
Girard which follows, by focusing upon the differences within the canonical form itself 
we will perhaps find a way through this apparent impasse, as well as a more lucid 
account that might serve to highlight the extreme political relevance of canons and of the 
Judeo-Christian scriptures in particular. 
 
III. Jan Assmann on the canon 
 
The initial consensus reaction to Sigmund Freud’s later work Moses and 
Monotheism was that it was a speculative exposition of an almost absurd claim, that 
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Moses was in fact an Egyptian and it was a repressed version of Egyptian monotheism 
that he revived and propagated in what was to become the Judaic form of faith.25  This 
initial scholarly reaction, however, subsided with time and gave way to a growing interest 
in Freud’s work by philosophers, critical theorists and psychoanalytic schools of thought 
which not only embraced his work on Moses but saw it as a exemplary forerunner of 
contemporary cultural studies.26  One of the most significant, and recent, contributions to 
this large body of work has come from the Egyptologist Jan Assmann, whose work on 
Freud, Moses, and any alleged Egyptian ties has actually led him to reconsider the role 
which the canonical form plays in formulating a cultural-religious worldview—that is, its 
role in terms of creating historical representations and repressing desire (its latency).  
Assmann, for his part, has indeed constructed a more developed and more encompassing 
speculative system of his own, one that expands beyond Freud’s project in order to depict 
specifically the role of canons in introducing a particular cultural and ideological violence 
of division within a given culture. 
Assmann’s redefinition of the Freudian project owes an obvious direct debt to 
Freud’s work on Moses, although he also takes a substantially nuanced position toward it.  
According to Assmann, the revealing of the centrality of the canonical form to western 
religious and political identity has been a project of the “unthought” which need not arise 
from beneath the surface of the text, as Freud himself sought to indicate through his 
depiction of the “unconscious” of a text.  This is the case for Assmann because texts 
dealing with historical representations, exemplified but not limited to the canonical form, 
actually reveal their truth on the surface.  
16 
What Freud unearths and dramatizes as a revelation is not the historical truth, but 
merely some theoretical constructs that turn out to be superfluous.  The truth can 
be found in the texts themselves.  They speak of memory, remembrance, 
forgetting, and the repressed, of trauma and guilt.  In order to uncover this 
network of meanings we have no need to practice the hermeneutics of distrust; 
nor need we read these texts against the grain.  We need only listen to them 
attentively.27 
 
In contrast to Freud, he undertakes what he terms as a “mnemohistory,” a study of the 
past not as it historically happened but as it is remembered by the texts themselves.  The 
task of such a study is to listen to the text in such a way as to unveil any ideological script 
which unfolds in the narrative, not to dig beneath it for one presumed to be repressed.  
This is actually a process, he states, which intends on getting behind the “mythical 
elements” embedded within traditions themselves.  Any history passed through a tradition 
is already a myth, while still yet maintaining a sense of historicity once it is 
“remembered, narrated, and used.”28  And in return, this discourse consisting of myth, 
once materialized as tradition, reproduces itself through its subjects.29  As we will see, 
Assmann reads Freud in this manner precisely in order to dislodge what he sees as the 
ideological script of monotheism presented in its canonical Judaic form, although in the 
end he might not be as free of canonical forms as his work seems to suggest. 
For example, Assmann contends that the book of Deuteronomy contains theories 
of individual, collective and cultural memory.  It confronts the Jewish people with the 
presence of a “counterfactual” memory and truly issues an imperative: they are called to 
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remember a “framework” outside their present reality (e.g. recalling nomadic life in the 
midst of the promised land, or hunger in the midst of abundance, etc).  This task is given 
to the people of Israel to keep “present to the mind a yesterday that conflicts with every 
tomorrow.”30  The presence of counterfactual memory arises not only from the 
consolidation of forty years of memory as a mnemonic technique, but as closely bound to 
the monotheistic conception of revelation, especially since both manifest characteristics 
of an “extraterritorial” nature.  That is, situating the divine granting of the Law in the 
wilderness becomes symbolic of nomadic wandering—an “extraterritorial” mandate 
which situates the Law as separate from any specific locality.  As Assmann puts it, “this 
means that the laws that they are to remember and abide by are not the laws of the land, 
but the extraterritorial laws from Mount Sinai.”31  This (re)defining of revelation and its 
relation to the canonical form is intended to expand Freud’s project of perceiving writing 
as a nomadic exercise always displacing itself in order to reveal the “fuller” 
consequences of producing a written, sacred canon.32 
In general, this reading of Freud allows Assmann to complete a reformulation of 
the canon itself—to see the desire for canonicity as a form of “counter-religion” that 
bears a constantly displaced revelation.33  “Counter-religions,” as the name implies, seek 
to counter already existing religious trends by positing a “counter-history” of their own, 
one always set in motion by and thereby inherently connected to an established canonical 
text.  These counter-histories aim to distort the self-image, identity, and memory of their 
adversary, offering their own “official” version of these constituent features through the 
instantiation of the canonical form.34  For Assmann, history in any form, including the 
canonical, becomes mythical again once it is “remembered, narrated, and used”, thus 
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providing a baseline ideological usage for itself, though not actually serving to negate the 
historicity of its account.35  Even an “imagined community” based upon a canonical 
foundation (to appropriate Benedict Anderson’s celebrated phrase) can accurately 
represent history though it functions politically in a polarized and polarizing ideological 
manner.36  Again, all normative canonical forms are inherently intertwined with the 
political landscape in which they originate. 
Assmann, through recognizing the pivotal role which an Egyptian monotheism 
played in forming the Israelite religion, establishes a structural parallel between two 
poles: revelation which is itself bound by the processes of the canonical (e.g. 
characterized by remembering, progression and a monotheistic or “Mosaic distinction” 
between true and false), and translation, which remained more ancient and bound to an 
oral culture (e.g. characterized by forgetting, regression and a polytheistic worldview).37  
As this tension outlines, Assmann links revelation and canonization as fundamentally 
intertwined projects, since religions based on a written revelation (and not simply the 
monotheistic ones) “are all founded on a corpus of canonical writings and thus on a 
highly authoritative codification of memory.  To belong to such a religion calls for this 
codified memory to be accepted and taken to heart.  Evidently, the importance of the 
codification and canonization of memory is linked to the structure of the revelation.  All 
revealed knowledge is by definition knowledge of something outside the world.”38 
In this manner, faith becomes equated with memory and, thanks to Freud, an 
“inner spiritual guide” viewed as a progression over an antiquated desire for natural 
evidence once sought so heartily to justify religious belief.  For Assmann, the decisive 
point remains the internal split in the subject brought about by monotheism’s claims to 
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divide reality into true and false, a split which renders the human heart itself subject to 
the dual traumas of desiring to be at home in the world (its pagan element), but also being 
told to reject and forget the false idols of paganism (its monotheistic side).39  It is also a 
division of the world brought about by the canonical form itself and is as such 
instrumental to certain political and ideological scripts.   
At the end of the discussion of Freud’s role within cultural canonical analysis, 
then, we are left with a de-centering of the trauma of monotheism, locating it not in the 
“Oedipal deep structure of the human psyche, but in the Mosaic distinction between true 
and false” that the canonical introduces into culture.  It could only be enacted perpetually 
because it is grounded as revelation and in a very literal sense runs parallel to the 
sovereign’s legitimation of power through recourse to a divine (transcendent) mandate.40  
The binary divisions introduced by the “Mosaic distinction”, in Assmann’s view, begin to 
perform what will become a “monotheizing” tendency of the canonical form.  As we 
have seen already in the cases of Schwartz and Smith, the canonical work introduces a 
fundamental division into culture, one which in effect could be said to generate a system 
of cultural significations and thereby create the apparently “non-canonical” or 
marginalized elements upon its fringes.   
Though all of this attests to the canonical form’s ability to generate cultural 
norms, our focus on the “return of the repressed”or a resurgence of the marginalized 
within (at times even seemingly against) canonically instituted divisions can help us to 
discern the cultural role of canonicity on a whole new level (as with its postcolonial 
reading by Smith).  The canonical form, as it were, is often said to “forget” the heretical 
and/or apocryphal texts only to face their reemergence later, often during periods of 
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religious renewal—an acknowledgement that is Assmann’s strongest claim concerning 
polytheism’s relation to monotheism.41  Functioning as signifier for an entire cultural-
symbolic system, the canonical form produces a context that could be said to perform 
some degree of violence upon the marginalized elements otherwise excluded from 
representation. 
This line of argumentation has been at the heart of several criticisms concerning 
Assmann’s work as a whole, and which he addresses in his more recent work Of God and 
Gods.42  Noteworthy in this regard is the criticism offered by then Joseph Cardinal 
Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) of Assmann’s alleged linkage between monotheism 
and violence, something which moved Ratzinger to remind those in the Catholic tradition 
of Christ’s proclamation of peace, as well as to point out how other, non-canonical 
religions have brought various violences into the world as well.43   
Responding to critics such as Smith and Ratzinger, who have seen his work as 
advocating something of a return to polytheism through the erasure of the true/false 
dichotomy, Assmann has nuanced his position by referring to the “latent monotheism 
within polytheism” as well as by offering a further distinction (beyond the simplified 
“Mosaic” one he offered earlier) between an intrasystemic violence (one translatable 
between cultures, and perhaps best exemplified by acts such as child sacrifice) and 
extrasystemic violence (one that is non-translatable, hence only serving as part of one’s 
conversionary experience).  Within this grid of violences, Assmann is able to critique 
monotheism’s basic contention that it is opposed to intrasystemic violence while yet 
simultaneously giving rise to extrasystemic violence through its acts of (often forced) 
conversion or destruction.44   
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By later giving nuance to his position in response to his critics, Assmann has 
actually come to in part defend a monotheistic worldview by illustrating its indebtedness 
to a particular historical conceptualization of justice.  In his view, the real contrast is one 
between an implicit theology (the cosmogony of a polytheistic worldview) and an explicit 
theology (the created order of the monotheistic one).45  Monotheism, from this 
perspective, becomes the inventor of “religion” as a concept as well as an embodied 
political practice, bringing a developed concept of justice from outside the traditional 
realm of (mythical-violent) religion into its inner self-definition.  Again, canonical forms, 
religion and politics are inextricably linked together as the central identifiers of “culture,” 
an originally western conceptualization that has since spread much wider since its 
“monotheistic” origins.  The traffic among these three conceptual realms is therefore 
fluid.  In this fashion, the monotheistic worldview is not only able to stand up as a critic 
of existing political structures, but is also capable of narrating a history based upon a 
divine notion of justice.46   
In his view, Judaism was able to prevent itself from becoming indebted to a 
system of violence by refusing to universalize its historical claims, leaving them open to 
the processes of an eschatology never foreclosed within history and thereby also 
maintaining justice as an always open horizon against which all (“righteous”) religious 
acts are formed.47  By this route of recirculation around his most analyzed concepts, 
Assmann comes very close to espousing a similar claim made in the last century by 
Walter Benjamin concerning the relation of the messianic to a divine and bloodless 
violence.  By such means, Assmann is also able to denounce any religion associated with 
manifest violent forms and to declare that the “power of religion rests on nonviolence.”48  
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The “weak form of truth” espoused here is a less-violent or even non-violent appeal to be 
sure, one coupled with its basic position as a counter-force to political power.  This can 
be found at the origins of all monotheistic, canonical claims, according to Assmann, 
though the history of their reception has often proved anything but non-violent.   
It is striking, however, that Assmann’s clarifications have themselves gravitated 
toward a reading of the non-violence at the center of the biblical canonical framework. 
This brings his position into sharp relief against the backdrop of opinions already formed 
concerning his work.  One of the large conceptual problems here, of course, is that there 
is a significant difference between non-violence and less violence.  As Smith claims, 
canons are inherently violent, and this would be a stark challenge to Assmann’s proposal 
of a non-violent core to the western monotheistic canon—if such a thing could even be 
said to exist.   
In order to sift further through such complex problems and as an extension of 
where Assmann’s arguments may ultimately lead, I turn to the work of the French literary 
theorist René Girard in order to clarify the distinctions of the canonical form in relation to 
violence and to analyze how the monotheistic canon might be said to reject or work 
beyond any extrasystemic violence still attached to its name.   
 
IV. René Girard on violence in different canonical forms 
 
Deepening an account of the canonical form can be performed in two ways.  On 
the one hand, it can be done by pursuing the foundations of the canonical form itself (its 
canonicity) which, in turn, can be seen to ground necessary cultural distinctions and as 
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such allow us to see how a necessary violence could be possible as a sign of cultural 
identity, albeit one that remains relatively “bloodless.”  On the other hand, one could (as 
Assmann does) distinguish the types of canonical violences by opening our horizon of 
understanding toward the processes of canonicity themselves and thereby producing 
evidence of the differences between canons.  Hence there are those canons which reveal 
violence and those which conceal it.  By making these distinctions, we would here be 
developing a modified version of Freud’s initial textual hermeneutic, which was intended 
to uncover what lies under canonical or normative texts, even if these “texts” are an 
individual’s personal narrative.  This textual hermeneutic has been extended furthest not 
only  in the work of Assmann, but through the work of Girard.   
In many ways, Girard’s reading of cultural and religious texts is a reapplication of 
Freud’s most basic insights, though it also shares in some of Assmann’s contentions that 
the “truth” of the text can be read on its “surface.”49  Consequently, Girard develops a 
fuller and deepened hermeneutic that combines fundamental insights from each: seeking 
what is repressed by reading what is already on the surface of the canonical text.  This is 
developed as a key for understanding the actual forces and violences latent within the 
processes of canonicity. 
By addressing the distinction between texts which reveal violence and texts which 
conceal it, I wish to move beyond the overly-simple appellations and condemnations of a 
general violence which is said to proceed from “monotheizing” canonical texts.  Such 
designations, as we have seen with Schwartz, often fail to produce an adequate account of 
the cultural forces necessary to signify a social reality.  They  normally make with vague 
reference to a more primordial state of existence (e.g. polytheistic, multiple, etc) and fail 
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to explain how any “primordial state” might be realized among canonical cultures as they 
are defined today.  They also fail to mention how we are to realize politically such non-
canonical configurations.  In this sense, there needs to be more regard for discerning how 
a canonical-cultural index could actually be dismantled, discontinued, or converted, if 
such a thing would be desirable or even possible to do within a given cultural context. 
What becomes apparent is the need to be more specific in defining the forms of 
violence performed by the “monotheizing” canonical work and to inspect the nature of 
the divisions it serves to create, deconstructing them when necessary in order to let 
justice proliferate.  Accordingly, the contrast between the version of monotheism inherent 
to the canonical form and the potential for another version of a cultural-canonical 
foundation to arise in its place hinges upon how the distinction between the concealing of 
violence (as one form of the canonical) and the revealing of violence (as another form of 
the canonical) becomes more pronounced.  
For Girard, as we will see, the contrast is one which illuminates an unconscious 
process of concealing the violence which gives rise to a particular civilization itself and 
which divides the canonical form into differing factions: those which testify against a 
particular violence and those which promote it, while  both signify differing cultural-
canonical distinctions between what is true or false. 
Over the last few decades Girard’s work has acquired something of a legendary 
status among certain scholars, especially those working within biblical or literary fields.  
Its ability to detail the intimate dynamics of desire and to overlay such descriptions onto a 
rich and vast literary heritage has drawn a great many admirers, though it has also been 
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criticized for its sweeping claims.  In many ways, it would not be too much to compare 
his “grand theory” to the Freudian corpus that preceded it. 
Essentially, Girard’s theory of the scapegoat—the seminal figure lying at the base 
of all societal formations—runs along these basic coordinates: the mimetic desiring of a 
given historical community must limit itself in order to function.  As can be imagined, 
desires that are produced merely through the imitation of another person’s desires (e.g., 
as can often be found in a “love triangle”, or in advertising) over time begin to run amok 
and risk the destruction of the community (or the “institution”, such as the family, a 
sport’s team, a particular organization, etc).  Rather than confront its own limitations 
directly, however, the community (often portrayed in literature as a “mob” or “crowd”) 
simply and often ritualistically selects a scapegoat, either arbitrarily or through the future 
scapegoat’s crossing of established cultural boundaries.  Such a figure, once designated, 
will then have to be “sacrificed”—either ritualistically killed or exiled from the 
community—in order for the community to continue its normal state of things.  In sum, 
the desire to deal with a crisis, itself a result of mimetic rivalry, generates a scapegoat 
who is dispatched and excluded from the community in order that the community might 
regain its sense of peace.  In reality, however, such sacrifices are only a temporary 
alleviation; the core of mimetic desiring itself has not been directly addressed and thus 
this cycle must repeat itself again and again.50   
In a reading that mimics Freud’s essential insight concerning Moses’ death, the 
memory of this violent event—so central to the community from which the myth 
originates and upon which the community itself is founded—is repressed in the mythical 
narrative and expunged from historical record, leaving only traces of its “truth” buried 
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under the thin veil of a cyclical scapegoating process.  The order now established within a 
society becomes mythically-based upon this falsified narrative, and peace becomes a 
temporary constraint upon mob violence—a matter of an impermanent alleviation, not an 
actual solution.51   
Girard, for his part, chooses to focus upon the manner in which the mythical text 
hides the violence at the origins of society, in strong contrast to how biblical texts reveal 
the mechanisms of scapegoating and the accompanying logics of exclusion as a false 
means of achieving communal solidarity.52  By carefully unpacking literary-historical 
(and many mythological) texts alongside the canonical biblical ones, Girard aims for a 
project of demythologization.  Yet this project also ends up restoring legitimacy to 
biblical texts through an illustration of their power to reveal the mechanisms of a mimetic 
desire that proves to be a means to the end of the cycle of mimetic violence.  This power 
of the text, then, serves as a confirmation and legitimization of the canonical work in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition that eventually takes the side of the victim of mimetic violence 
(the excluded or sacrificed figure) while still maintaining the need for a canonical form.  
This alignment tends to redefine the relation of the canonical form in social-cultural 
terms over against the mythological canon which glorifies and justifies the violent 
founding acts of a society’s order. 
As one example of this mechanism, we might take Girard’s analysis of the 
contrast between two founding myths of society.  First, there is the Roman legend of 
Romulus and Remus, brothers who clash over the boundaries of the ancient city, with 
Romulus eventually killing his brother Remus.  In this particular myth, there is no 
judgment passed by the narrative itself upon Romulus’ actions; he simply becomes the 
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founder of Rome.  Next, there is the biblical story of Cain and Abel, where Cain kills his 
brother Abel out of jealousy at God’s having bestowed his favor upon Abel.  This story 
differs from the typical myth, in Girard’s view, in that there is a negative judgment 
passed upon Cain as God sides with Abel’s innocence.  According to the biblical text, 
even though Cain goes on to found civilization, his actions are viewed as contrary to the 
canonical viewpoint—in absolute contrast to the Roman legend.53 
Like Freud, Girard reads what would generally be considered as both “canonical” 
and “non-canonical” texts, especially as it is the varied, and often non-canonical texts that 
bear direct witness to this unconscious dimensions of violence inherent to the processes 
of mimetic desiring.54  Though Girard himself does not utilize this distinction as such 
between texts, it is important to note that his chosen texts, whether biblical or 
mythological, could be perceived as cultural-foundational, and, in that sense, always 
“canonical” in the culturally specific sense in which this essay uses the term.  Indeed, his 
entire theory rests upon the manner in which ancient texts are said to be canonical, that is, 
constitutive of culture, and hence forming communal-ideological positions based upon 
the outcome of a particular mimetic rivalry. 
While any direct reflection on canonical form seems absent from Girard’s work, 
in fact it becomes the necessary link toward establishing an alternative process of 
historical memory apart from mythology.  In a sense, any community which adopts a 
textually-based ritualistic prohibition upon mimetic violence and which seeks to end the 
cyclical processes of violence instituted through scapegoating is indeed paying homage to 
certain processes of canonicity: the ones that side with the excluded (and not merely 
marginalized) victim, as opposed to the mythological forms of canonicity that endorse of 
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sacrificial violence.  This is a careful distinction we must make with regard to Schwartz’s 
critique, since Girard functions as the critic of her position insofar as he sees the Bible as 
fundamentally different from myth in its obsessive preservation of repressed narratives.55   
At this point, Girard’s distinction between canons becomes a central addition to 
our notion of canonicity, as it contains the potential for either an obsessive recording of a 
particular, repressed history (viewing the canonical as an attempt to do justice to the 
memory of an excluded people) or an obstruction of the violent truth behind the narrative 
(viewing the canonical as a legitimization of a particular dominant and exclusory 
ideology).  At its core, then, the canonical form either exposes or conceals the violence at 
the center of human desiring.  Either way, though, it is a process essential to social 
collective formations as we witness them in our world today.   
Canonicity is thereby further defined through these insights as itself being a 
mimetic structure which responds to a crisis and then follows either a “truthful” relating 
of the actual processes of mimetic desiring, or a “falsified” relating which seeks to cover 
over its literal truth.  The former definition, for its part, would seem to open us toward the 
foundation of an ethics, whereas the latter would open directly onto the field of ideology.   
The formulation of canonicity is in fact the juxtaposition of an ethically less (but 
not non-) violent canon, wherein the powerless are allowed representation and the 
potential for justice to be done is increased, over against an ideological mythical one, 
wherein the powerless are scapegoated (not just marginalized) and perpetually at risk of 
being removed from society in general.  The latter is a position that inherently opens the 
door to extra-systemic violences, as Assmann had earlier defined them.  This emphasis 
elevates the principle of justice (seeking after the lesser violence) as a central 
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hermeneutical key to reading canons and to mediating any conflict of methodologies 
when dialoguing over a canonical text.  This also grants a space for representation not 
only of the excluded victim of an exclusive society, but also of the marginalized person 
within a particular non-exclusive community, bringing their right to assert subjectivity 
within a public forum created by the “truth-telling” canonical work.  This responds to 
those who criticize Girard for being too simplistic or idealistic with regard to the 
distinctions drawn between different societies.  It is also, I would add, one productive 
way to enact a “democracy of words” in the face of ongoing ethical violence.56   
 
V. Conclusions: Redefining the Canonical 
 
The canonical form, in this context, could thus be said to function as a dominator 
over its oppressed elements, continuously seeking their exclusion from representation and 
considering them as “unthinkable” within its “matrix of intelligibility.” But the canonical 
could also be said to function as engaged with its marginalized elements, making them 
“thinkable” when necessary, even as central at times to the construction of any future 
cultural identity.  
In this latter sense we can perceive the canon as capable of being aligned with a 
history of particular repressions, as potentially also bearing witness to them, and 
performing a certain justice to their memory when situations or events deem that it be so.  
Seeing this act of justice within a given canonical community, tradition, or text is 
essential if we are to move beyond the ideological suppression of marginal persons or 
histories. The very presence of a cry for justice within certain canons can function as a 
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permanent fissure within any claims to totality or dominance which might otherwise 
arise.  Rather than doing away with canonical forms and their binary division of reality, 
what such a reading of canonical forms offers us is a “division of division” itself, one 
starkly reminiscent of the Pauline attempt to turn the division of Jew and Gentile into one 
involving another level of flesh and spirit (Romans 8). 
Drawing distinctions between the varying forms of violence present in our world 
thus assists us in forming a more complete picture of how different cultural formations 
arise based upon different notions of the canonical form generated, in turn, by different 
processes of canonicity.  What emerges from this analysis is a powerful critique of social 
norms, differentiating those that derive from a truthful exposure of violence (siding with 
the excluded or repressed elements) from those that derive from a falsified justification of 
violence (siding with the dominant or exclusive elements).  The potential to utilize this 
schema in discerning cultural conflicts is perhaps as vast as the implications for 
evaluating canonically-derived ethical paradigms.   
In the formation of (ethical) subjects, produced by a given canonical form and 
therefore bound to certain historical processes of canonicity, the grounds for establishing 
the canonical form as a site of power are revealed most fully.  It might seem paradoxical 
to suggest that the canonical form has the potential to preserve what appears as “non-
canonical” (the echo of the marginalized), but that is the ethical import that follows from 
this analysis. 
The stark contrasts of canonical presences within varying cultures, which each of 
these authors helps to illuminate, brings us to reconsider in what ways those who are 
excluded or marginalized might benefit from a greater understanding of canons and their 
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constitutive power.  The force of this redefinition of canons discloses a profound 
connection between canonical texts and the collective, cultural memories of repressed 
peoples who engage with such texts.  The “revolutionary” tactic of assimilating canon to 
memory, a tactic which allows repressed memories and histories to be recognized as 
events which bring their own understanding before the canonical norm, must be seized 
upon and continuously repeated.57  The power of such negotiation between these two 
poles of narration is not only a service to the representation of those whose memories 
would otherwise quickly be forgotten in history, but also a model for reinterpreting the 
canonical texts themselves, opening them still further to new interpretations.  This is also 
a task which theology must learn to take seriously, especially when performing its own 
acts of self-reflection. 
Consequently an ethical dimension is revealed within the nature of the canonical 
form and the preservation of memory, one which elicits our theological response as 
communities of a sacred canon.58  The canonical form must not be harnessed to justify 
dominant oppressive cultures, unjust hierarchical forms, or other totalitarian powers, 
though it undoubtedly can be utilized to do so.  Rather, it must be seen as a guarantor of 
the voices of the marginalized throughout history if it is to express itself as a site of truth, 
expose the falsity of a violence-oriented society, or become a site of revelation.   
In a seemingly paradoxical inversion, the truthful canonical form actually has the 
potential to preserve the marginalized figure at its core through its fidelity to a sense of 
messianic justice that is always increasingly on the rise and always to-come.  It opens 
itself to the voices of the marginalized within who do not threaten to undo the canon so 
much as to offer a possibility of less violence being done in the canon’s signification of 
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cultural subjects.  The marginalized thereby serve as a constant disruption of any attempt 
to totalize canonical representations, a disruption that is starkly more or less welcomed by 
differing cultural viewpoints.   
This is not to suggest, of course, that every apparent non-canonical representation 
is aligned in near perfect symmetry with a marginalized element, but only to suggest that 
a possibility lies open already within a given, particular canonical form.  Eric L. Santner 
points out, in a critique of Assmann’s position, that his “Mosaic distinction” is correct in 
a certain sense and yet misses the larger point: the trauma induced by this fundamental 
cultural division with which we identify is what enables us to relate to the trauma of the 
other and thereby greet them as our neighbors.59  This would undo canonical forms from 
within and render their divisions less divisive—a “division of division” itself. 
Moreover, this paradoxical act of unveiling the unconscious of a text at the level 
of its conscious readability constitutes a self-reflexive movement wherein the canonical 
form stands “exposed” as it were, not as a prelude to its eventual decanonization, but as a 
gesture of self-reflexive understanding formed in relation to the desire for canonicity 
itself.  Those who are subjects of the text and invested in the life of canons and their 
communities, who wish to stand in good faith with the canonical form itself, must begin 
to (re)read their own identities in light of the dynamisms generated not only between 
canonical forms and perceived non-canonical ones, but in the canonical form itself, a 
collection of multiple, dynamic desires therein united.  Subjects of the text must likewise 
play host to a certain unveiling of their unconscious desires for (re)producing a text and 
for writing themselves into its narrative time and again—a decisive and consequential 
reworking of the roots of those theological accounts of confession normative to many a 
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religious tradition.  This dynamic process of interaction with the canonical form can thus 
evolve over time as a basic foundation for ethical paradigms, in order that a more proper 
interpretation of a particular canonical text might itself further evolve through time. 
 Beyond simply being an apologetic account of sacred scripture, the theological 
implications held in reserve within a study of canonicity and its relation to the canonical 
form are manifold and varied, produced by the foundational sense in which these 
processes can be said to generate culture and politics itself.  Perhaps most acutely situated 
within this horizon for critique are implications for what a self-reflexive study of 
theology as a truth-telling, violence-exposing discipline might be.   
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